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1. Introduction
In the Nordic countries1, criminalisations must fulfil certain criteria in terms of 
criminalisation principles.2 The most significant advantage of criminalisation is gen-
eral prevention, which is pursued by targeting the criminal law to generally valued 
1 The concept of ‘Nordic countries’ includes in this study Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 
Iceland has been left out of the study due to procedural, economic, and geographical reasons.
2 This article approaches the subject through the disposition generally adopted in the Finnish 
criminal law of a division into four principles of criminalisation: the principle of legality, the 
principle of justified object of protection, the principle of social cost evaluation, and the principle 
of ultima ratio. See, e.g., Tapani & Tolvanen, Rikosoikeuden yleinen osa – Vastuuoppi. 2nd ed. 
(Helsinki 2013); Melander, Kriminalistointiteoria – Rangaistavaksi säätämisen oikeudelliset 
rajoitukset (Helsinki 2008); Frände, Yleinen rikosoikeus (Helsinki 2012); Tapani & Tolvanen, 
Straffrättens ansvarslära (Helsinki 2016). Some scholars consider the integrity of human dignity 
(see, e.g., Melander (2008)) or autonomy of an individual (see, e.g., Nuutila, Rikosoikeudellinen 
huolimattomuus (Helsinki 1996)) as a separate criminalisation principle. I consider them as a 
part of the human rights system, guiding the formation of the entire criminal law system, and 
don’t see any additional value in handling them also as separate principles of criminalisation. 
This is somewhat similar to Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), p. 77. The position of the other principles 
is handled later in the text. Although other Nordic countries do not have a corresponding 
approach, the prerequisites for criminalisation are equitable, and can be outlined using the 
Finnish model for the purposes of this research. 
* Laura Tammenlehto is a commercial law lecturer and criminal law doctoral researcher at the 
University of Eastern Finland Law School. Email: laura.tammenlehto@uef.fi
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objects of protection and criminalising behaviour that is generally considered repre-
hensible.3 The purpose of criminalisation is to indicate the societal blameworthiness 
of a conduct and to secure order and safety in society, not to pursue the interests of 
the victim or to function as an instrument of protecting private property interests.4 
However, criminalisation merely to demonstrate the authority of the government 
is not acceptable.5 Criminalisation principles thereby limit the use and content of 
criminal law.6 The most central principles are the following. 
Most fundamentally, criminalisations must be based on the letter of the law (the 
principle of legality).7 The principle of legality legitimises criminal legislation by tying 
it to law enacted by parliament and divides powers by setting the parliament as the 
sole legislator.8 Furthermore, criminalisation shall always have a justifiable object of 
protection, that is, it should always be designed to safeguard some legitimate pro-
tected interest (the principle of justified object of protection).9 The societal advantages 
gained with the criminalisaton shall exceed the disadvantages caused to both society 
and to the perpetrator (the principle of social cost evaluation).10 Social costs include 
limitations on the right of self-determination, control and enforcement costs, un-
3 Melander (2008), pp. 480–484.
4 Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg, Kriminalrättens grunder. Svensk strafrätt I, 2nd ed. (Uppsala 2013) pp. 
34–35; Tolvanen, Johdatus kriminaalipolitiikan teoriaan (Joensuu 2005), pp. 141–142.
5 Tolvanen (2005), p. 143; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg, (2013), p. 48. Even though the principle of 
legality has significant meaning also as justification of the entire criminal law system, I do 
not consider this to affect its position as a criminalisation principle as well. See, e.g., Tapani & 
Tolvanen (2013), p. 77.
6 Melander (2008), p. 193; Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), p. 76; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), pp. 
42–43; Andenæs, Alminnelig Strafferett. 6th ed. (Oslo 2016), pp. 72–73. 
7 Melander (2008), pp. 193–194, HE 44/2002 vp. p. 28; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), p. 46; 
Andenæs (2016), p. 106
8 Roxin, Strafrecht: Algemeiner Teil. Bd 1, Grundlagen – Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre (München 
2006), pp. 146–147.
9 Nuotio, Teko, vaara, seuraus. Rikosvastuun filosofisista, kriminaalipoliittisista ja lainopillisista 
perusteista (Helsinki 1998), p. 497; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), p. 39-40; Greve, Det 
straffretlige ansvar (København 1999), p. 37. These objects of protection are often based on basic 
and human rights, although no absolute requirement for them to be an expression of basic and 
humans rights system is set. Criminalisations protecting interests derived from other societal 
needs are also acceptable, but need to be justified from the basic and human rights perspective. 
Melander 2008, pp. 344–351. Basic rights in the national constitutions get their foundation from 
international human rights conventions. See FC 731/1999 Chapter 2; SC 1974:152 Chapter 2; 
and 1991:1469 Chapter 1-3, NC LOV-1814-05-17 Chapter E, DC LOV nr 169 af 05/06/1953 
Gældende Chapter VIII, and international conventions European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union.
10 Melander (2008), pp. 474–477; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), p. 42; Greve (1999), p. 42; and 
NOU 2002:4 p. 82–84.
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desirable societal side effects11, and problems with equality.12 It is essential to assess 
both advantages and disadvantages, and to weigh them against each other.13 
Criminalisation shall also be used only as the last resort in interfering in individ-
uals’ lives (the principle of ultima ratio). Before making certain behaviour criminal, 
the usability and functionality of other societal means of reaction, such as civil rem-
edies, should be investigated. Criminalisation is acceptable only if the desired effect 
cannot be achieved by these other means.14 Criminalisation shall not be resorted to 
just to be on the safe side.15 The ultima ratio principle consists of two elements. First, 
the principle relates the criminal justice system to other parts of the judicial system. 
It requires consideration of other means for effective societal control before crimi-
nalisation is applied. Second, the principle requires the legislator to assess the extent 
of the current legislation and whether existing offences cover the essential parts of 
the criminalisation now in question.16
The position of the principle of legality, which provides the central perspective of 
this article, is stronger compared to the other principles. First, it is the only princi-
ple that is legitimised directly by legislation. In the Nordic countries, it is defined in 
national laws17 and has its normative foundation also in European and internation-
al human rights conventions.18 For other principles, there are no specific provisions 
that define their exact content, although institutional support for them can be de-
rived from other articles in European and international human rights conventions.19 
Second, the principle of legality is also constitutive for the entire criminal law system 
11 An example of these can be given regarding, e.g., criminalising sexual services. Enacting 
prostitution as generally punishable might lead to more secretive practices, which could increase 
the power of pimps and further deepen the dependence of prostitutes. The social exclusion of 
prostitutes and the threat of abuse would also increase as they would not have an opportunity to 
choose their customers, while the law-abiding customers would no longer use their services. HE 
221/2005 vp., 16-17.
12 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), p. 89.
13 Melander (2008), pp. 491–492; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), pp. 42–43.
14 Melander (2008), pp. 391–393, 509; Lernestedt, Kriminalisering. Problem och principer (Iustus 
2003), pp. 19-21; Greve (1999), pp. 42–43; and NOU 2002:4 pp. 82–84.
15 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), pp. 91–92, 
16 Melander (2008), pp. 403–407. 
17 In Finland and Norway, the principle of legality is found in both the Constitution FC 731/1999 
Chapter 2 Section 8 and NC LOV-1814-05-17 Section 96 and the Criminal Code FCC 39/1889 
Chapter 3 Section 1 and NCC LOV-2005-05-20-28 Chapter 3 Section 14. The wordings of these 
two vary a little, but the content is the same. In Sweden and Denmark, the Criminal Codes 
define the content of the principle at, respectively, SCC 1962:700 Chapter 1 Section 1; and DCC 
LBK nr 976 af 17/09/2019 Chapter 1 Section 1. The location of the enactment does not affect the 
validity or the importance of the principle.
18 Art. 7 ECHR, Art. 15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Art. 49 Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
19 Melander (2008), pp. 173–174, 193. 
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instead of being just a principle affecting the form and content of specific criminal 
legislation.20 The principle of legality strengthens legal protection of individuals by 
defining the limits within which the use of criminal law system is justified in the 
first place.21 Regarding individual criminalisations, the principle of legality primar-
ily regulates the form of concrete criminal provisions, whereas the other principles 
concern the content of criminalisations. However, the principle of legality also affects 
the wording of criminalisation. It therefore contributes to forming the content by de-
finining how clearly and precisely the criminalised behaviour must be described, and 
the phrasing and style chosen indicates the scope of the offence.
This article studies criminalisation of intellectual property rights (IPR) infringe-
ments. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) lays down minimum standards for criminal enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights for its members.22 The TRIPS Agreement enacts mandatory 
criminal procedures and penalties, at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting 
and copyright piracy on a commercial scale (Article 6123).24 According to the TRIPS 
Agreement, the objective of IPR legislation is not to provide the maximum possible 
profit to right-holders, but to find the proper balance between private and public in-
terests.25 In the trade context, this means the avoidance of the distortion of the system 
towards either too much or too little protection, which can in turn lead to inefficiencies 
in the commercial exploitation of creation and innovation, or enable misappropriation 
of intellectual property.26 All Nordic countries are members of the WTO and are bound 
by the TRIPS Agreement. The structures and content of the copyright and trademarks 
acts in the Nordic countries are similar due to the effects of the TRIPS Agreement, 
other international conventions, and the intensive Nordic co-operation in this field in 
20 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), p. 77
21 Melander (2008), pp. 193-194; HE 44/2002 vp., pp 28-29.
22 Kur & Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law. Text, Cases & Materials (Cheltenham/
Northampton 2013), p. 29.
23 Article 61 of the TRIPS agreement enacts that: “Members shall provide for criminal procedures 
and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright 
piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary 
fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes 
of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the seizure, 
forfeiture, and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the 
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide 
for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual 
property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.” 
Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed 
in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm (last accessed 26 October 2020).
24 Taubman, Wager & Watal (eds.), The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases 
and Materials (Cambridge 2012), pp. 575–577.
25 Taubman, Wager & Watal (2012), p. 11.
26 Kur & Dreier (2013), pp. 6–7.
22
Laura Tammenlehto
the 1960s and 1970s. The EU has also given various directives in this field.27 There are 
slight differences between the IPR laws, such as some requirements concerning nation-
al authorities or the order of sections, but the core of protection is the same.28 
IPRs as objects of protection differ from other more traditional property objects 
due to their intangibility. IPRs cannot be defined as units in a way that traditional 
movable or immovable property can be defined. They are rights to utilise one’s creation 
economically, in whichever form the creation exists, as long as the creation exceeds 
certain thresholds for the formation of IPR. Also, the use of IPRs differs from the use 
of traditional property objects. IPRs can be used simultaneously by many users with-
out one use affecting the other or diminishing the value of the used object.29 This in-
creases difficulties of fitting them into the existing criminal law system, for the system 
has been created from the perspective of traditional concrete property objects.30 The 
core ideology in the IPR system is to provide wide and strong protection for products 
of intellectual creation, with the aim of encouraging creativity. This means approach-
ing the matter from the starting point that the right-holder has the exclusive right to 
decide about the use of the IPR and that all use without the right-holder’s consent is 
presumptively infringing.31 This approach has mitigated over the years; however, trac-
es of this ideology are still visible, e.g., in the crime provisions regarding IPRs. 
This article studies copyright and trademark offences in the Nordic countries from 
the perspective of the principle of legality. There are two main research questions: 1. 
How do the current Nordic copyright and trademark offences fulfil the requirements 
of the principle of legality? 2. How could these offences fulfil the requirements of the 
27 For more about the effect of the EU directives, see, e.g., Rosén, De nordiska upphovsrättslagarnas 
framtida struktur, NIR 6 (2012), pp. 587–597; Schønning, Ophavsretsudviklingen i Danmark 
siden 2009, NIR 6 (2012), pp. 538–545; Wallberg, Varumärken i ljuset av EU-utvecklingen NIR 
1 (2005) pp. 85–105; Gundersen, Varemerket i lys av EU-utviklingen, NIR 1 (2015) pp. 106–119; 
and Kylhammar, Varumärken i ljuset av EU-utvecklingen, NIR 1 (2005) pp. 120–131.
28 Olsson, Copyright – Svensk och internationell upphovsrätt, tionde upplagan (Stockholm 2018) 
pp. 34–35; Haarmann, Immateriaalioikeus, 5th ed. (Talentum Media 2014) p. 49; and Schovsbo, 
Rosenmeier & Petersen, Immaterialret (København 2018) pp. 688–69. 
29 Weckström, Trademarks in Virtual Worlds: Law, Outlaws or New in-Laws?, Journal of 
International Commercial Law and Technology 7(2) (2012), pp. 116–117. 
30 A good example of the difficulty of the field can be shown using the common theft offence. In 
common theft of, e.g., a bicycle, the object of protection (the tangible property) is concretely taken 
away from the owner’s sphere of influence when stolen. In IPR ‘theft’ the object of protection is 
not lost so to speak, but the ‘stealing’ is done in parallel to the legal use. This makes it difficult, 
on the one hand, to separate the lawful and unlawful use and, on the other hand, to define the 
extent of the infringement and loss, while neither the lawful nor unlawful use actually lessens the 
value of the IPR. See Weckström (2012), pp. 117–118, especially regarding trademarks.
31 Bernitz, Pehrson, Rosén & Sandgren, Immaterialrätt och otillbörlig konkurrens. Fjortonde 
upplagan. (Stockholm 2017), pp. 8–10, 409–411. Here is a significant difference between the two 
systems. The criminal law system sanctions acts from the perspective of society. The IPR system 
evaluates the reprehensibility of acts and harm and damage caused by them from the perspective 
of the individual right holder. 
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principle of legality better? The study will show how the phrasing and style of the of-
fences in question in fact cause just such application and legal protection issues that 
the principle of legality is designed to prevent. In the field of IPRs, the form of the 
criminal provision should give more specific content to the criminalisation by defining 
the concrete criminalised conducts and objects of protection more precisely than they 
do. The unclarity and vagueness regarding the definitions of both objects of protection 
and infringing activity, combined with the nature of IPRs as property objects, demand 
more precise essential elements.32 This article suggests the use of civil sanctions as an 
alternative, in order to enable more specific definitions of criminal conducts. 
This article concentrates on three problematic aspects in the field of IPRs: copy-
righted work threshold, moral rights, and establishing trademark through use. Other 
IPR offences are mainly left out of this article. However, many parts of this study may 
be applied also to those criminalisations, as their essential elements are similar to the 
essential elements of trademark offences. Discussion of principles of criminalisation 
other than the principle of legality is left out of this study, although some references 
to them are made in order to point out their significance in practice.33 Similarly, this 
study does not treat the topic of criminalisations of either circumvention of technical 
protection of copyrighted work or violating electronic docket information on rights, 
nor the import of pirated goods and trademark licencing.
The following chapters will analyse the problems starting with defining the con-
tent of the principle of legality in chapter two. Chapter two also defines the central 
concepts of copyright and trademark law and exemplifies the issues regarding the 
principle of legality with them. Chapter three analyses the essential elements of copy-
right and trademark offences in the Nordic countries. Chapter three also shows the 
concrete problems in the drafting of the offences and points out which parts of them 
could fulfil the requirements of the principle of legality better. Chapter four suggests 
solutions to the problems presented in chapters two and three. 
2. The Principle of Legality in the IPR Context
2.1 General Remarks and Central Concepts  
In the Nordic countries, the principle of legality directs criminalisations and the use 
of criminal law. The principle of legality consists of four elements: the requirement 
of written (criminal) legislation, the prohibition of analogy, the prohibition of ret-
32 The concept of ‘essential elements’ means the characterisation of the criminalised behavior that 
is written in a specific crime provision and must be fulfilled (in addition to other grounds for 
liability) for criminal liability to actualise.
33 The other principles of criminalisation are not completely overlooked, as they are studied in this 
context in my other research.
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roactivity, and the prohibition of vagueness.34 The purpose of the principle is to en-
sure the legitimacy of the penal authority of the state and to protect the rights of an 
accused.35 The use of criminal law must be foreseeable.36 However, the state can, in 
some situations, execute its power contrary to the principle of legality if the actions 
and results are in the accused’s favour.37 
The drafting of the essential elements of the Nordic copyright and trademark of-
fences causes problems from the perspective of the principle of legality, especially 
regarding clarity and precision. Particularly problematic elements are the multiple 
internal references and use of the blanket criminalisation technique, combined with 
the abstractness and inaccurate definitions of the objects of protection, and the at-
tempt to reach exhaustive protection. These problems are particularly evident in the 
following three areas of copyright and trademark law: copyrighted work threshold38 as 
a prerequisite for copyright protection, the subjective dimension of the moral rights 
of an author, and the conditions for establishing trademark protection through use. 
The problem with each of these aspects of the law is that it is impossible to define 
their existence or content merely based on the legislation—case-specific deliberation 
is needed. Nevertheless, they form part of the basis for certain IPR criminalisations.
First, the Nordic countries apply a ‘copyrighted work threshold’ to determine wheth-
er a work is independent and original enough to fall under copyright protection.39 In 
order for a work to cross this threshold it needs to be such that no one else completing 
the same process would have come up with exactly the same result.40 Some EU direc-
tives and their interpretation have raised discussion about the position and validity of 
this requirement.41 However, in this context the concept of copyrighted work threshold 
is still a valid instrument to describe the minimum criteria of copyright protection.
34 Melander (2008), pp. 200–204; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), p. 46; Langsted, Garde & Greve, 
Criminal Law in Denmark, 4th ed. (Alphen aan den Rijn 2014), pp. 33–38; Matningsdal, Straffeloven. 
Alminnelige bestemmelser. Kommentarutgave (Oslo 2015), pp. 91–95. Additionally, the European 
Court of Human Rights has validated this division in its case law, e.g., in cases Kokkinakis v. Greece, 
appl. no. 14307/88, 25.5.1993 and Cantoni v. France, appl. no. 17862/91, 11.11.1996.
35 Melander (2008), pp. 193–194.
36 Jareborg, Allmän kriminalrätt (Iustus 2009), pp. 57–58.
37 NOU 1992:23, p. 72
38 The concept of ‘teoskynnys/verkshöjd’ is an entirely Nordic phenomenon and translates poorly in 
English. More specific content of the concept is explained later in the text.
39 Haarmann (2014), pp. 54–56. 
40 Eidsvold-Tøien, Originalitetskriteriet i EU-retten – ny kurs? NIR 4 (2012), p. 403. 
41 Kopp, The Evolvement of a European Concept of the protected Work of Authorship, NIR 3 (2012), 
pp. 248–263; Eidsvold-Tøien (2012), pp. 403–422; and, e.g., cases C-5/08 Infopaq; C-393/09 
Ministertvo Kultury; C-604/10 Football Dataco; and C-145/10 Painer regarding the originality 
requirement in the EU. See also, NJA 2015 p. 1129; Rydén, Det upphovsrättsliga originalitetskravet 
i ljuset av utvecklingen i Europeiska unionens domstol. En kommentar till Högsta domstolens 
dom den 29 december 2015 (NJA 2015 s. 1129), NIR 2 (2016), pp. 205–209; Rt. 2007 p. 1329; and 
Stenvik, Utviklingen på immaterialrettsområdet i Norge, NIR 6 (2008), pp. 549–550.
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In evaluating whether a copyright infringement exists or not, one must first evaluate 
whether the piece of work that is copied exceeds this threshold. The essential ele-
ments of a copyright offence cannot be fulfilled if there is not a piece of work that is 
protected by copyright. The legislation does not define copyrighted work threshold 
accurately (or at all), and it varies between different types of work.42 The court can 
only retrospectively define and confirm that a piece of work exceeded copyrighted 
work threshold and was protected by copyright at time at which it was copied.43 This 
increases the unforeseeability of this area of criminal law. It becomes extremely diffi-
cult to determine in advance which type of behaviour by the actor targeted to which 
type of work will fulfil the essential elements of a copyright offence. 
Second, the criminalisation of the infringement of copyright also includes the in-
fringement of moral rights as a form of prohibited conduct in all Nordic countries.44 
Infringing a right holder’s moral rights means, for instance, leaving the name of the 
author, the work, the performer, or the photographer unmentioned when using the 
protected material. It also includes changing the work in a way that offends the au-
thor’s literary or artistic dignity or eccentricity and distributing the work to the pub-
lic in the above-mentioned offensive form. The evaluation of whether moral rights 
have been infringed includes right holder-centered viewpoints. In other words, the 
evaluation is partly based on the right holder’s subjective conception of derogatory 
actions, and what the author perceives to, for instance, harm his reputation, artistic 
dignity or eccentricity, or the originality or value of the work. General criteria for 
acts that society considers as violating moral rights do not exist.45 This increases the 
level of abstraction and makes it rather difficult to assess in advance which actions 
are criminally punishable and which are not. 
The third problem concerns trademarks and is comparable to the situation re-
garding copyrighted work threshold. According to Nordic trademark laws, trade-
mark protection can be established through use in addition to registration.46 However, 
the laws do not define specifically either: 1. The procedure through which trademark 
protection can be established through use (‘the how’), or 2. The exact moment when 
trademark protection is considered to be established through use (‘the when’). The 
42 Haarmann (2014), p. 58; Olsson (2006), pp. 66–68; and Eidsvold-Tøien (2012), p. 403.
43 Tapio, Fair use ja kolmivaiheisesti joustavamman tekijänoikeudellisen sääntelyn mahdollistajina, 
Lakimies 1 (2013), pp. 34–54 at p. 36.
44 Kur and Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law (Cheltenham/Northampton 2013), p. 21, 
and Haarmann (2014), p. 149.
45 The infringement of moral rights may also have economic impact on the right-holder if, for 
instance, the loss of reputation affects the sale of the work. See Pihlajarinne, Immateriaalioikeuden 
yleiset opit ja digitalisoituminen – vertailussa tekijänoikeus ja tavaramerkkioikeus, Lakimies 3 
(2012), pp. 383–396 at p. 384. However, these types of damages are compensated through civil 
remedies and mere financial loss to an individual is not enough to justify criminalisation.
46 Haarmann (2014), p. 314; Regeringens proposition 2009/10:225 p. 69; and Ot.prp. nr. 98 (2008–
2009) pp. 41–42.
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court must case-specifically and retrospectively define these two elements before the 
existence of an exclusive right is clear. As will be shown in the following chapters, 
this increases the vagueness of trademark offences and the unforeseeability of the 
outcome of their interpretation and application. 
2.2 Problems Regarding the Use of Blanket Criminalisation Technique 
The blanket criminalisation technique means that the criminal provision itself in-
cludes merely the threat of penalty, and the actual essential elements of the crimi-
nal conduct are determined based on other regulation.47 In other words, at least two 
different provisions are needed to define the criminalised behaviour. These provi-
sions can either be enacted in the same statute or two different statutes.48 The blan-
ket criminalisation technique itself is not in conflict with the principle of legality, as 
long as the references between the blanket provision and the regulation defining the 
content of the criminalisation are clear and precise.49 It is also required that the blan-
ket provision should include some kind of characterisation of the criminalised be-
haviour, even though the actual content of the criminalisation is to be defined based 
on other regulation.50 
According to the requirement of written legislation, sentencing someone to a 
criminal sanction requires that the action in consideration must fulfil the essential 
elements of an enacted applicable criminal provision.51 In other words, punishable 
criminal conduct must be based on the letter of the law.52 The requirement of writ-
ten legislation is fulfilled by defining the punishable conduct in either the criminal 
provision itself or, when concerning blanket criminalisation, in the regulation that 
defines the actual content of the criminalisation. 
Regarding the requirement of written legislation, the problem is not so much in 
the blanket criminalisation technique itself, but in making sure that the regulation 
that defines the actual content of the criminalised behaviour is enacted with the pre-
cision required from criminal legislation, and that it together with the blanket norm 
47 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), pp. 130–135; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013) p. 360; Tapani & 
Tolvanen, Starffrättens ansvarslära (Helsinki 2016) pp. 64–65; and NOU 1983:57, p. 125. 
48 Only one of these regulations needs to be an act, the other can be an act or a lower level statute. 
For more, see, e.g., Frände, Yleinen rikosoikeus. 2nd ed. (Helsinki 2012), pp. 33–40; Lernestedt 
(2003), pp. 328–332; and NOU 1983:57, p. 125.
49 Melander (2008), p. 223
50 Ibid.
51 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), pp. 125–126; Asp & Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), pp. 45–47; Andenæs 
(2016), p. 101; and Tapani & Tolvanen (2016), p. 63. However, the principle of legality does not 
prohibit acquittal based on unwritten legislation. Frände (2012), p. 30, Andenæs (2016), p. 123.
52 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), p. 102; Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), p. 46; Waaben, Strafferettens 
specielle del, 5th ed. (Thomson-GadJura 1999), p. 72; and Matningsdal (2015), p. 89.
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gives content to the criminalisation. Therefore, in evaluating the fulfilment of this 
requirement, especially regarding blanket criminalisations, it is not enough that the 
provisions defining the content of the criminalisation are in a document considered 
as ‘written legislation’, for instance, in a special IP law. These provisions must also ac-
tually describe the forbidden behaviour in a way that enables people to tell based on 
the legislation whether a certain act is punishable or not. 
The Nordic countries use the blanket criminalisation technique to criminalise 
copyright and trademark infringements. This choice of technique is problematic. The 
different sections of the special laws that should define the limits of criminalised be-
haviour are in parts so arcane and general that one could argue that the criminalised 
behaviour is not written in the legislation at all. It is not enough to write several gen-
eral provisions in laws to fulfil this requirement if concrete actions cannot be defined 
from them. The problem with Nordic copyright and trademark regulation is that the 
acts that give content to the blanket criminal provisions enact every possible con-
tradicting act as an infringement and, therefore, as criminally punishable. Also, the 
blanket provisions themselves do not actually define any type of conduct that is pun-
ishable. They merely enact as punishable the violation of the right of another without 
characterising at all what actually is considered as violating the right of another (or as 
the right of another for that matter). Here the legislation in theory fulfills the require-
ments of the principle of legality regarding form; however, the criminalisation does 
not really get any precise content. 
An excellent example of the problem is when reproductions are made of a work 
that may exceed the copyrighted work threshold. The Nordic copyright legislation 
defines that copyright protection extends, in addition to written, artistic and other 
specifically listed forms of works, to works that are expressed in some other manner. 
The Norwegian Copyright Act includes more specific regulation regarding a work 
that is protected by copyright than in other Nordic countries. Chapter 1 Section 2 
of NCA defines individuality and originality as prerequisites of copyright protection 
and gives an example list of types of work that fall under copyright protection. The 
section, however, uses the wording ‘such as’ in front of the list, which could indicate 
that some other type of work that is not specifically defined in the example list could 
become protected by copyright. Therefore, I consider the argumentation here valid 
also regarding Norwegian legislation, even though the wordings vary from those of 
other Nordic countries.
A work protected by copyright must exceed copyrighted work threshold, that is, be 
independent and original enough that no one else in a similar situation would come 
up with the same result. Ultimately, the court defines the threshold for independence 
and originality for each piece of work separately. These thresholds are not written 
in the legislation, and case law regarding similar types of work does not guarantee 
that every piece of that type of work with similar qualities automatically exceeds 
the copyrighted work threshold (although it helps in the determination). Defining 
whether a written work (a form of expression which is specifically listed as protected 
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by copyright) exceeds copyrighted work threshold is often difficult.  One may, for ex-
ample, ask if lecture slides are independent and original enough to be considered as a 
copyright protected piece of work, or just a summary of common knowledge. Defin-
ing whether a work expressed in some other manner, a manner which is possibly not 
yet known and for that reason neither listed in the provision nor evaluated by courts, 
exceeds copyrighted work threshold, is extremely difficult. 
Reproduction of a copyright protected work in violation of copyright law is crim-
inalised in every Nordic country. According to the Nordic copyright legislations, 
reproduction comprises making copies of the work in whole or in part, directly or 
indirectly, temporarily or permanently, and by any means or in any form whatsoever. 
The reproduction of a work also comprises the transfer of the work to another de-
vice, by which it can be reproduced or communicated. The phrasing ‘by any means 
or in any form whatsoever’ leads to similar unforseeability as above regarding copy-
righted work threshold. It is very difficult to foresee which types of conduct could in-
fringe the right-holder’s exclusive right to reproduction, as certain types of conduct 
may not even exist yet. In light of these examples, one could argue that the infringing 
conducts are actually not written in the legislation, at least not precisely enough, as 
the legislation does not specify any actual way to make copies and reproduce a piece 
of work. 
In addition to the problems described concerning the requirement of written leg-
islation, the above-mentioned examples are also useful to show the problems regard-
ing vagueness. The prohibition of vagueness requires the legislator to enact limited 
and precise criminalisations.53 This means that the essential elements of a crime must 
be phrased so that the actual content can be understood from the wording of the 
criminal provision.54 In other words, the limits of the criminalised behaviour must 
be foreseeable based on the wording of the law.55 The problem of the Nordic copy-
right and trademark offences is that the essential elements in them do not set any 
accurate limits to criminalised behaviour. The other provisions of the special laws, 
which should give more precise content to the criminalisations, do not define these 
limits more clearly either. Without any limits, it becomes very difficult to evaluate 
which type of behaviour actually is punishable. 
53 Matningsdal (2015), p. 91; Langsted, Garde & Greve (2014), pp. 34–35; Jareborg (2009), p. 58; 
and Tapani & Tolvanen (2013) pp. 135–136.
54 PeVL 48/2002 vp, pp. 2–3.
55 Melander (2008), pp. 246–250; Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), p. 246; Frände (2012), p. 37; Jareborg 
(2009) p. 58; and Langsted, Garde & Greve (2014), pp. 34–35. This requirement is often 
exemplified with the starting point that the description of the criminal conduct and the threat of 
penalty must be expressed with such clarity that at least a person with legal training will be able 
tell in advance which actions are criminalised and how severely. However, it is desirable that an 
average citizen can also, at least on some level, determine based on the law whether a certain 
behaviour is punishable or not. See, e.g., Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), p. 246; Jareborg (2009), p. 
58 and Langsted, Garde & Greve (2014), pp. 34–35.
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As described above, the Nordic copyright and trademark criminalisations are enact-
ed by using the blanket criminalisation technique, which itself may cause precision 
problems and be problematic from the point of view of the requirement of written 
criminal legislation.56 In copyright and trademark offences the blanket criminalisation 
technique is executed either by referring to the entire special law (using formulations 
such as ‘who violates the sections of this law shall be sentenced…’) or by listing sever-
al other sections of the special law in question, the breach of which actualises criminal 
liability. Basically, the criminalisation consists of a closed set of norms based on which 
it should be possible to define the exact limits of the criminalised behaviour.57 Howev-
er, the problem is that some of the central elements affecting the evaluation of wheth-
er the exclusive right has been infringed or even exists are not defined in the law, but 
are rather derived from case law, ‘good practice’ rules, or moral starting points.58 
An excellent example of the above-mentioned problems in the field of copyright 
is the Finnish Supreme Court case KKO 2018:21, in which the Supreme Court end-
ed up changing its previous line of interpretation without any notable changes in 
the copyright legislation. The case concerned the making of a copy of a photograph 
in the form of a painting, photographing that painting, and distributing this photo-
graph to an audience through sale in a gallery. The Supreme Court, deviating from 
its previous line of interpretation, held that an infringing copy of a photograph can 
be created by painting. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not state anything re-
garding the principle of legality; the criminal law evaluation concerned merely the 
fulfilment of FCC Chapter 4 Section 2, regarding mistake as to the unlawfulness of 
the act.59 I do not find the Supreme Court’s interpretation regarding the FCC sec-
tion in question satisfactory. The court focused on the perpetrator’s primary plea that 
painting is not a way to manufacture a ‘piece’60 of a photograph. The court evaluated 
whether this plea could be considered as an excuseable mistake as to the lawfulness 
of the act, based on the obtuseness of the law (FCC Chapter 4 Section 2(2)). The 
court did not find the behaviour excusable based on FCC 4 2(2); however, the Su-
preme Court did not (at least not explicitly) consider the influence that their own 
56 See more about the problems of blanket criminalization technique eg. in Melander (2008), pp. 
220–230.
57 Frände (2012), p. 33.
58 Pihlajarinne (2012), p. 384. It is relevant to point out that compared to the core moral concerns 
of criminal law (e.g., violations of health, freedom and sexual integrity), the moral starting points 
of IPRs are of different character and are not as easily justifiable with societal morality norms, 
because of the economical nature of the rights.
59 KKO 2018:21, paragraphs 46 and 47. FCC Chapter 4 Section 2 regarding mistake as to the 
unlawfulness of the act states that:
“If the perpetrator errs in regarding his or her act as lawful, he or she is exempt from criminal liability if 
the mistake is to be deemed manifestly excusable due to the following factors: (1) the defective or errone-
ous publication of the law, (2) the particular obtuseness of the contents of the law, (3) erroneous advice by 
an authority, or (4) another reason comparable to these.”
60 The law and the court speak of producing ‘pieces’ of a photograph, rather than ‘copies’.
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previous case law may have had on the perperator’s mistake as to the unlawfulness 
of the act, which they should have done based on FCC Chapter 4 Section 2(4). The 
Supreme Court’s grounds for the chosen interpretation were unfortunately short. I 
would argue that this case shows rather well the challenges vague legislation creates 
to legal security and foreseeability when the previously confirmed line of interpreta-
tion can change without any changes in the written legislation. 
The situation is fairly similar in the field of trademark law regarding establishing 
trademark through use. The Nordic laws do not define when or how trademark is es-
tablished through use. The court must define case-specifically and retrospectively the 
exact moment when the exclusive right started, as well as the extent of the exclusive 
right covered by the trademark in question. The criminalisation appears not to be 
enacted with the required precision, as the formation of the exclusive right of trade-
mark cannot be determined from the letter of the law, and therefore its existence is 
not foreseeable. For instance, if the court does not consider the trademark in question 
to be established through use, the protected exclusive right does not exist. If there is 
not an exclusive right, there cannot be an IPR infringement. This leads to a situation 
in which, prior to the deliberation of the court, an act may either fulfil or not fulfil the 
essential elements of a crime. Indeed, any act whatsoever may or may not fulfil them. 
Yet, the potential perpetrator should be able to evaluate at the time of conduct wheth-
er his behaviour is infringing or not. In this situation, the perpetrator may risk break-
ing the law, even if they do their best to avoid it.61 Also, if the formation of the exclusive 
right to trademark can, for instance, take anything between one week and five years of 
use (due to the lack of any guidelines from the legislation), criminal liability becomes 
very unforeseeable. Even though some unclarity is generally accepted,62 I would argue 
that it does not include the law being entirely silent about one of the central founda-
tions for criminal liability regarding trademark infringements (or copyright infringe-
ments for that matter), i.e., the existence of the object of protection.63 I would argue 
that to ensure legal certainty, the legislation should include some guidelines for inter-
pretation regarding the possibility of establishing trademark through use.
2.3 Threats to the Prohibition of Analogy and Prohibition of Retroactivity
The second element of the principle of legality, the prohibition of analogy, forbids the 
application of criminal law to the detriment of the accused in situations that do not 
61 This is also rather interesting from the point of view of intent and what the perpetrator ought to 
have known on the time of the conduct. This matter will be analysed further in another article.
62 See Melander (2008), p. 248.
63 This can be exemplified by comparison to manslaughter. The criminal provision regarding 
manslaughter does not specify the way in which the killing of a person must be done in order to be 
considered manslaughter. What is essential is that a person has died. However, there is no question 
of whether the object of protection (a person’s life) has existed before or been violated by the killing.
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fit the wording of the essential elements.64 The starting point is that criminal sanc-
tions must not be used unless the conduct in question fits into the wording of the 
description of a punishable act.65 Analogy is forbidden if it widens the scope of crim-
inal liability.66 However, drawing the line between forbidden analogy and teleologi-
cal interpretation is difficult. Applying teleological interpretation such that it widens 
the sphere of criminalisation should be avoided, especially in interpreting criminal 
provisions that are already vague, such as IPR offences. The vague criminalisations 
themselves may lead to unforeseeable outcomes, and teleological interpretation can 
worsen this problem. However, defining the sphere of criminalisation for copyright 
and trademark crimes comprehensively is itself extremely difficult, which in turn 
makes it difficult to say when the interpretation of these crime provisions actually 
widens the sphere of criminalisation.67 
For instance, in Finnish case KKO 2003:88 (illegal marketing and selling copyright 
and trademark protected software products) the Supreme Court considered the inter-
pretation of the concept of ‘a device’ when judging what constituted illegal distribu-
tion of a device for removing a technological measure protecting a computer program. 
The Supreme Court held that written installation instructions could not be considered 
as ‘a device’ without deviating from the wordings of the provision in question in a 
forbidden way.68
It is impossible to determine exactly when an interpretation goes outside the word-
ing of a criminal provision in a forbidden way.69 However, in light of what is stated 
above, I would argue that if the phrasing of a provision does not specify an act at all, 
64 Asp & Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), pp. 46–47
65 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), pp. 111–112. In Finland, analogy which prejudices the accused 
is forbidden, but teleological interpretation of criminal law is allowed and used. Teleological 
interpretation means that the person applying the law interpretes the legislation starting from 
its goals and purposes. See Tolvanen (2005), p. 212. Teleological interpretation is possible for 
narrowing of the scope of punishable behaviour without any restriction set by the principle of 
legality. See, e.g., KKO 2016:42 (Finland)
In Denmark, the use of analogy in criminal law is specifically enacted as allowed in the DCC, 
including analogy that prejudices the defendant, which creates conflicts with the international 
human rights conventions. Nevertheless, analogy is seldom used in the field of criminal law. 
The conflicts have been recognised and the courts endeavor to solve complicated situations with 
other measures than analogy. See Langsted & Garde & Greve (2014), p. 34–35. 
66 An example of forbidden analogy could be, for instance, when a situation is comparable to the 
criminalised situation and in some parts even similar to the description in the law, but would 
not fit in the actual wordings of the law. Another type of forbidden analogy could be a situation 
in which the general spirit of criminal law and the general sense of justice could support the 
penalisation of said situation without it having anything to do with the actual criminalisation. 
See Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), pp. 111–112.
67 Tapani & Tolvanen (2016), pp. 55–63; Tolvanen (2005), pp. 212–216; Frände (2005), pp. 56–58. 
68 See KKO 2003:88 paragraph 2.2.
69 Andenæs (2016), p. 112.
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it is inevitable that an interpretation will go outside the scope of the written law.70 On 
the other hand, such openly phrased provisions can also be seen as an acceptance of 
analogy, because they allow basically any act to fall under the application of the pro-
vision. In essence, this allows analogy in criminal law even though the principle of 
legality forbids it. 
The principle of legality prohibits open-ended criminalisations. Instead, crimi-
nalisations should be enacted clearly and precisely, and be modified and expanded 
when societal development necessitates it.71 These types of extensive criminalisations 
are problematic in the field of copyright and trademark because, as will be shown in 
the next part, copyright and trademarks infringement criminalisations are written 
in a way that makes every act that is in violation of the copyright or trademarks acts 
potentially punishable. Thus, a serious consideration of revising the legislation and 
more precisely limiting the descriptions of punishable acts is needed. 
The problem of using analogy culminates in a situation where people are not able 
to foresee in advance what type of behaviour is allowed and what is forbidden ac-
cording to the legislation. If the essential elements of a crime are vague or open, the 
risk of widening their interpretation and going outside the wording of the law in 
applying them increases.72 This also includes a risk of widening the scope of crimi-
nalisation uncontrollably. This is one of the problems of the current Nordic copyright 
and trademark criminalisations. 
The Finnish Supreme Court considered the difficulties regarding the principle of 
legality, especially the prohibition of analogy and the requirement of written legisla-
tion, in connection with the industrial property rights offence provision in case KKO 
2018:36. In this case, the perpetrators were accused of illegally copying products that 
were protected with community trademarks73 and community designs74. The Finn-
ish Supreme Court came to the conclusion that, due to the principle of legality, the 
perpetrators could not be convicted of industrial property rights offences based on 
FCC Chapter 49 Section 2, because the wording of this criminal provision does not 
specifically forbid violations of community trademark and community design. The 
Supreme Court based its argumentation on the lack of specific references to com-
munity trademark and community design in the national legislation regarding cor-
responding national exclusive rights. However, the Supreme Court did not consider 
70 Andenæs (2016), p. 121.
71 Melander, Rikosoikeudellinen laillisuusperiaate ja rikosoikeudellinen tulkinta, Defensor Legis 4 
(2015), pp. 644–661, at p. 650.
72 Melander (2015), p. 649.
73 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark.
74 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 on Community designs.
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the position of the TRIPS Agreement regarding the matter,75 nor did it specify the 
purpose of the protection that the industrial property rights crime provision pur-
sues, define what is the core substance of the crime at hand, or contemplate whether 
an opposite result would have been reasonably foreseeable.76
The prohibition of retroactivity means that it is not permissible to apply crimi-
nalisations to acts committed before the criminalisation was in force or to harden the 
threat of penalty in a way that has retroactive effects.77 In pursuance of this principle, 
when legislation has changed between the time of conduct and the time of proceed-
ings, what legislation is applicable must be detetermined based on the leniency of 
the result it would provide, in favour of the defendant.78 This part of the principle of 
legality seems fairly clear, for the defendant either has committed the crime during 
the time at which the legislation was in force, or has not. This element does not have 
as much room for interpretation as the other three.
However, the application of this principle has had significant effects on perpetrators’ 
sentences, e.g., in Finnish case KKO 2010:47 (Finreactor), in which the perpetrators 
were merely convicted of a copyright misdemeanour and fined, because the act did 
not fulfil the essential elements of the copyright crime of that time. Distributing files 
in information networks and data systems was not criminalised in Finland as copy-
right crime with the threat of penalty of imprisonment at the moment of the con-
duct (29 August – 14 December 2004)79, but the criminalisation was added to FCC in 
2006.80 Therefore, the judgement does not handle the matter as copyright crime at all, 
but as copyright misdemeanour. The copyright misdemeanor provision was revised 
accordingly.81 The Supreme Court applied the older legislation because the application 
of the 2006 copyright misdemeanour provision would not have led to a more lenient 
75 Interestingly, the Supreme Court stated that the TRIPS Agreement does not apply in the 
situation, for the national legislation has not been changed based on said agreement. 
However, the Supreme Court did not give any guidelines on how to approach alignment of the 
legislator in implementing the TRIPS Agreement to national legislation. Tammenlehto, KKO 
2018:36. Teollisoikeusrikossäännöksen soveltuminen yhteisön tavaramerkin ja yhteisömallin 
loukkauksiin, in Timonen (ed.), KKO:n ratkaisut kommentein 2018:I., (Alma Talent 2018), p. 
289. The legislator specifically stated in implementing the TRIPS Agreement that the legislation 
in force (including the industrial property rights crime provision) fulfils the requirements of the 
TRIPS Agreement, that is, provides similar protection to other IPRs as the national ones. HE 
296/1994 vp., pp. 23–24, 104, HE 119/1999 vp, p. 2. 
76 Tammenlehto (2018), pp. 288–289. Here must be pointed out that the Finnish Trademarks Act 
was renewed after this ruling and specific references to community trademarks were added 
to it, so the significance of this ruling regarding similar cases in the future may not be very 
substantial. However, the interpretative elements, which the Finnish Supreme Court did not take 
into consideration, mostly remain inspite of the renewed legislation.  
77 See, e.g., case KKO 1999:115 (Finland).
78 Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), pp. 138–139 and Langsted, Garde & Greve (2014), p. 35 
79 See KKO 2010:47.
80 HE 28/2004 vp., p. 73.
81 HE 28/2004 vp., p. 131–133.
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result than the application of the copyright misdemeanour provision in force at the 
time of the offence.82 
Interestingly, at nearly the same time in Sweden (in the Finnish case the time of the 
conduct was 29 August – 14 December 2004 and in the Swedish case 1 July 2005 – 
31 May 2006), the perpetrators were convicted of a copyright offence with up to ten 
months of imprisonment for a similar type of conduct as in KKO 2010:47.83 Another 
interesting point was that the Swedish court convicted the perpetrators of aiding and 
abetting in a copyright offence without recognising the actual main offender. In the 
Finnish case KKO 2010:47, the accused were found guilty of the similar (although 
petty) crime as offenders. Both cases were about maintaining a file sharing service 
platform. These types of differences in sentencing may encourage the perpetrator to 
weigh different possibilities in choosing the place of the crime.
3. Analysis of the Essential Elements of Nordic Copyright and 
Trademark Offences
The essential elements of a crime are the most important components in defining 
the content of criminalised behaviour.84 In assessing the fulfilment of the essential 
elements of a crime, the starting point is to define the object of legal protection, 
whether it has been violated in the situation at hand, and how severely.85 To apply 
the essential elements of copyright or trademark offences in the Nordic countries, 
one must determine whether the object of protection exists—in this situation, ei-
ther an exclusive right to exploit the piece of work financially (i.e., copyright) or 
an exclusive right to exploit a trademark. This is done by determining whether the 
piece of work in question is protected by copyright (i.e., exceeds copyrighted work 
threshold) or, in the case of trademarks, whether the sign is either registered as a 
trademark or trademark protection is established through use. In the field of copy-
right, this leads to a situation in which actors (often ordinary people without legal 
training) must be able to evaluate whether the piece of work in fact exceeds the gen-
erally undefined copyrighted work threshold in order to foresee whether their ac-
tions might violate copyright and lead to criminal sanctions. Regarding trademarks, 
the situation is clear if the sign in question is registered as a trademark. However, 
in the case of trademarks that are established through use, the actor must be able to 
determine if the sign in question has been in use for so long and is so well known 
in the field of business in question that the requirements of establishing trademark 
through use are fulfilled. 
82 KKO 2010:47 paragraph 8.
83 See case SH 4041-09 Pirate Bay.
84 Asp, Ulväng & Jareborg (2013), p. 58; Tapani & Tolvanen (2013), pp. 100–101, 103–104.
85 Waaben (1999), pp. 50–51
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Similar difficulty is detectable in the infringement of an author’s moral rights of copy-
right. In violating the author’s literary or artistic dignity or eccentricity, the perpe-
trator ought to be able to evaluate beforehand what this specific author will see as 
a violation. However, criminal responsibility for this type of behaviour does not re-
quire the perpetrator to know who the actual right-holder is.86 It is inconsistent that 
the perpetrator, without knowing who this right-holder is, is expected to be able to 
evaluate the right-holder’s subjective conceptions of derogatory actions regarding 
his moral rights. Similar elements of subjective conceptions are included in other 
forms of criminal conduct, for instance, defamation and sexual harassment. In these 
crimes, however, the identity of the victim is usually known and there are clearer 
societal behavioural norms to be followed.87 Also, the act is targeted directly at the 
victim and not at an inanimate creation of the victim.
The technical realisation of the essential elements of Nordic copyright and trade-
mark offences, i.e., the form of the offences, varies somewhat between different 
countries. In Sweden, Norway and Denmark, copyright and trademark crime provi-
sions are located in special laws. Both the copyright acts and trademark acts include 
a specific section regarding criminal liability (in Sweden SCA (1960:729) Chapter 7 
Section 53 and STA (2010:1877) Chapter 8 Section 1; in Norway NCA (LOV-2018-
06-15-40) Chapter 5 Section 79 and 80, and NTA (LOV-2010-03-26-8) Chapter 8 
Section 61; and in Denmark DCA (1144 af 23/10/2014) Chapter 7 Section 76 and 
DTA (LBK nr 88 af 29/01/2019) Chapter 6 Section 42). In Finland, the crime pro-
visions regarding both copyright and industrial property rights crimes are in the 
FCC (39/1889) Chapter 49 Section 1 and 2, whereas pettier offences are made pun-
ishable by misdemeanour provisions in special laws (FCA (404/1961) Section 56a, 
FTA (544/2019) Section 74). The crime provisions describe the starting points that 
should help specify the actual criminalised conducts. In the copyright acts, several 
specific sections follow the general description of the criminalisation, the breach of 
which actualises the liability. Common to all countries is that the acts criminalise the 
breach of both economic and moral rights.88 The criminal provisions themselves do 
86 HE 94/1993 vp. pp. 213–215 (government proposal).
87 In both defamation and sexual harassment, the victim’s experience of the violation is essential 
in considering the fulfilment of the offence, in addition to generally accepted societal norms 
that define the limits of forbidden behavior. Even though the objects of protection are different 
in defamation and sexual harassment than in infringement of moral rights of copyright, the 
evaluation of personal experience in all of them can be equated to each other. However, there are 
not similar societal norms concerning the line between acceptable and inacceptable behaviour 
regarding infringement of moral rights of copyright as there are regarding defamation and sexual 
harassment. It seems that society has clearer conception of what is considered to be an insult or 
a sexual act than what is considered, for example, to be the violation of artistic integrity by 
changing and distributing a piece of work. Therefore, even though the inclusion of these types of 
subjective conceptions in the evaluation of the fulfilment of a crime can be perfectly acceptable, 
when regarding moral rights they become unacceptably vague and unforeseeable because of the 
lack of societal norms, and the possible ignorance of the identity of the victim. 
88 Olsson (2009), pp. 308–309.
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not contain any actual specific descriptions of acts, which is typical for the blanket 
criminalisation technique. If one takes a closer look at the crime provisions, it be-
comes obvious that the provisions ought to be clearer.
Regarding copyright infringement criminalisations, the essential elements are 
most clearly defined in Sweden and most ambiguous in Finland. The current Swed-
ish copyright offence (SCA Chapter 7 Section 5389) is phrased rather simply com-
pared to other countries’ provisions, as it only includes a couple of cross-references 
to other sections and does not define any aggravating circumstances that might affect 
the evaluation of a situation. The Swedish IPR legislation is, however, in transition.90 
The IPR offences in each special law, including the copyright and trademark legis-
lation analysed in this article, are now supplemented with aggravated forms of in-
tentional acts. The new law defines four alternative elements, the existence of which 
may lead to the infringing action being evaluated as aggravated. These elements are: 
particular premeditation of the act, the act being done as a part of organised crime, 
the act being particularly wide, and the act being otherwise especially dangerous in 
nature. The new legislation came into force on 1st July 2020.91 This change in legisla-
tion slightly complicates the Swedish IPR offences, but it can still be argued that they 
remain the clearest compared to other Nordic criminalisations. 
89 SCA Section 53: 
“Den som beträffande ett litterärt eller konstnärligt verk vidtar åtgärder, som innebär intrång i den till 
verket enligt 1 och 2 kap. knutna upphovsrätten eller som strider mot föreskrift enligt 41 § andra stycket 
eller mot 50 §, döms, om det sker uppsåtligen eller av grov oaktsamhet, till böter eller fängelse i högst två år.
Den som för sitt enskilda bruk kopierar ett datorprogram som är utgivet eller av vilket exemplar 
har överlåtits med upphovsmannens samtycke, skall inte dömas till ansvar, om förlagan för kopieringen 
inte används i näringsverksamhet eller offentlig verksamhet och han eller hon inte utnyttjar framställda 
exemplar av datorprogrammet för annat ändamål än sitt enskilda bruk. Den som för sitt enskilda bruk 
framställer exemplar i digital form av en offentliggjord sammanställning i digital form skall under de 
förutsättningar som nyss nämnts inte dömas till ansvar.
Vad som sägs i första stycket gäller också, om någon till Sverige för spridning till allmänheten för 
in exemplar av verk, där exemplaret framställts utomlands under sådana omständigheter att en sådan 
framställning här skulle ha varit straffbar enligt vad som sägs i det stycket.
Den som har överträtt ett vitesförbud enligt 53 b § får inte dömas till ansvar för intrång som omfat-
tas av förbudet.
För försök eller förberedelse till brott som avses i första och tredje styckena döms till ansvar enligt 23 
kap. brottsbalken. Lag (2005:360).”
90 The changes in legislation have been followed until May 2020, when the final version of the 
article was accepted for publication.
91 Draft Law Council proposal, published 27 november 2019: https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-
dokument/departementsserien-och-promemorior/2019/11/skarpta-straff-for-de-allvarligaste-
fallen-av-immaterialrattsintrang/ (last accsessed 26 October 2020), pp. 1, 4, 13, SOU 2018:6 
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The Norwegian (NCA Chapter 5 Sections 79 and 8092) and Danish (DCA Chapter 7 
Section 7693) copyright offences are more complicated than the Swedish ones, as they 
include more internal references to other sections of the law, the breach of which 
actualise and give content to criminal liability. They also include a list of aggravat-
ing circumstances that may increase the sanction. They do not, however, include any 
unambiguous statement of whether all these requirements must be met before the 
conduct is considered to be of aggravated form, or that one of these requirements is 
enough to fulfil the essential elements of the aggravated crime. 
The state of the law is most ambiguous in Finland, because the criminal provi-
sions are in two different laws, the FCA and the FCC, with internal references to each 
other and to several other sections of the FCA. The copyright crime provision in the 
92 NCA Section 79: 
“Den som begår inngrep i en annens rett eller på annen måte overtrer §§ 3, 5, 13, 16, 20 til 24, 59, 60, 99 
til 107 og 108 siste ledd, straffes med bøter eller fengsel inntil ett år. Det samme gjelder den som overtrer 
forbud nedlagt etter § 62 eller § 108, eller bestemmelser gitt av opphaver etter § 75 andre ledd. Det samme 
gjelder også den som innfører eksemplar av åndsverk eller av arbeider og opptak som nevnt i §§ 16, 20, 
22, 23 og 24 i den hensikt å gjøre dem tilgjengelige for allmennheten, når eksemplarene er fremstilt uten-
for landet under slike forhold at en tilsvarende fremstilling her i landet ville vært i strid med denne loven.
Den som unnlater å oppgi opplysninger som nevnt i § 61 andre ledd eller unnlater å påføre op-
plysninger som nevnt i § 112 på et verk vedkommende forestår trykkingen av, straffes med bøter.’
NCA § 80: ‘Den som begår grovt inngrep i en annens rett etter §§ 3 første og andre ledd, 5, 16, 20, 22 
til 24, straffes med bøter eller fengsel inntil tre år.
Ved vurderingen av om grovt inngrep foreligger, skal det særlig legges vekt på den skade som er 
påført rettighetshaveren og andre, herunder skade på rettighetshaverens anseelse og kommersielle om-
dømme, den vinning som inngriperen har oppnådd, og omfanget av inngrepet for øvrig.”
93 DCA Section 76: 
“Med bøde straffes den, som forsætligt eller groft uagtsomt
1) overtræder § 2 eller § 3,
2) overtræder §§ 65, 66, 67, 69, 70 eller 71,
3) overtræder § 11, stk. 2, § 60 eller §§ 72-75,
4) undlader at fremsende opgørelse eller oplysninger efter § 38, stk. 7,
5) undlader at lade sig anmelde eller undlader at meddele oplysninger til fællesorganisationen efter 
§ 41, stk. 1, § 42, stk. 6, og § 46, 1. pkt., eller undlader at føre eller opbevare regnskaber i henhold 
til § 45 eller
6) overtræder forskrifter, der er givet efter § 61, stk. 2.
Stk. 2. Er en overtrædelse af de i stk. 1, nr. 1 og 2, nævnte bestemmelser begået ved forsætligt og un-
der skærpende omstændigheder at gengive de af bestemmelserne omfattede værker eller frembringelser 
eller blandt almenheden at sprede eksemplarer heraf, kan straffen stige til fængsel i 1 år og 6 måneder, 
medmindre højere straf er forskyldt efter straffelovens § 299 b. Skærpende omstændigheder anses navnlig 
for at foreligge, hvis overtrædelserne sker erhvervsmæssigt, hvis der fremstilles eller blandt almenheden 
spredes et betydeligt antal eksemplarer, eller hvis værker og frembringelser gengives på en sådan måde, at 
almenheden får adgang til dem på et individuelt valgt sted og tidspunkt, jf. § 2, stk. 4, nr. 1, 2. led.”
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FCC specifies the object of the exclusive right,94 the violation of which is punishable, 
but the exact definition of the object of protection as well as the content of the actual 
criminalised behaviour must be defined through the FCA. As regards the object of 
protection, this includes both the economic (FCA Section 2) and moral rights (FCA 
Section 3) of the copyright owner, which are not defined in the FCC but only in the 
FCA. As regards the content, the FCC criminalises the violation of the right of an-
other to the specific works, but the FCA fails to specify what types of action actually 
are infringements. It does not define, for instance, manufacturing a copy of a work or 
distributing a copy of a work to the audience. 
The provision also adds two requirements to be fulfilled before the act can be 
considered a copyright crime: that the act is executed with an aim to make profit, and 
that the act is executed in a manner conducive to causing considerable detriment 
or damage to the person holding a right. However, if the act is committed by us-
ing computer networks or computer systems, the aim to make profit is not required 
for the act to be considered a copyright crime. This exclusion results from different 
characteristics of violations conducted in computer networks and computer systems 
compared to other copyright infringements. It is typical that illegal music and vid-
eo recordings are distributed in computer networks without the distributors gain-
ing any financial profit, but this still causes considerable damage to companies doing 
business in the field. Because of the requirement of aim to make profit, the digital 
operations mentioned above were previously punishable only as copyright misde-
meanours, the maximum penalty for which did not allow the police to use sufficient 
coercive measures in investigating the infringements. Consequently, the infringe-
ments in question have almost without exception been left unpunished. Due to this, 
it was considered necessary to include these acts in the copyright offence provision 
by leaving out the requirement of aim to make profit.95
These latter two requirements—the aim to make profit and that the act is exe-
cuted in a manner conducive to causing considerable detriment or damage to the 
person holding a right—are equatable to the Norwegian and Danish aggravating cir-
94 These are the rights of another to:
1) a literary or artistic work,
2) the performance of a literary or artistic work or of national heritage,
3) a record or other device on which sound has been recorded,
4) a film or other device on which moving images have been recorded,
5) a television or radio broadcast,
6) a register, table, program or another similar work referred to in the
Copyright Act and containing the compilation of a considerable amount
of information, or a database the compilation, verification or presentation
of which has required considerable effort, or
7) a photograph (FCC Chapter 49 Section 1).
95 HE 28/2004 vp., pp. 72–73.
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cumstances, with the difference being that in Finland all of them must be met in or-
der for the essential elements of the copyright offence to be fulfilled. The FCA misde-
meanour provision (FCA Chapter 7 Section 56a96) criminalises the making of a copy 
of a work or making a work available to the public contrary to the provisions of the 
Copyright Act. This means that in order to find out what is actually punishable, one 
must interpret all Sections of the FCA even vaguely related to the above-mentioned 
actions. The drafting of the copyright misdemeanour provision is equatable to the 
Norwegian and Danish offences. The same style continues for the part concerning 
the infringement of moral rights, and at the end of the provision there is a general 
clause making punishable any action that ‘otherwise violates a provision protecting 
copyright in the Copyright Act’. There are also specific sections mentioned, as in oth-
er Nordic countries, the breach of which may actualise criminal liability.
As for trademark infringement criminalisation in Sweden97, the situation is not 
as complicated as in evaluating copyright offences. The same can be said of both-
96 FCA Section 56a (Tekijänoikeusrikkomus):
“Joka
1) tahallaan tai törkeästä huolimattomuudesta valmistaa teoksesta kappaleen tai saattaa teoksen 
yleisön saataviin tämän lain säännösten vastaisesti tai rikkoo 3 §:n säännöksiä moraalisista oi-
keuksista,
2) muuten rikkoo sellaista tämän lain säännöstä, jolla suojataan tekijänoikeutta, taikka toimii 
vastoin 41 §:n 2 momentin nojalla annettua määräystä, 51 tai 52 §:n säännöstä taikka 53 §:n 1 
momentissa tai 54 b §:n 1 momentissa tarkoitettua kieltoa, taikka
3) tuo maahan tai Suomen alueelle edelleen kolmanteen maahan kuljetettavaksi teoksen kappa-
leita, joiden hän tietää tai joita hänellä on perusteltua syytä epäillä valmistetuiksi ulkomailla sel-
laisissa olosuhteissa, että valmistaminen Suomessa olisi ollut rangaistavaa tämän lain mukaan, 
on tuomittava, jollei teko ole rangaistava rikoslain 49 luvun 1 §:ssä tarkoitettuna tekijänoikeusrikoksena, 
tekijänoikeusrikkomuksesta sakkoon. 
Tekijänoikeusrikkomuksena ei pidetä muutaman kappaleen valmistamista yksityistä käyttöä 
varten sellaisesta tietokoneella luettavassa muodossa olevasta tietokoneohjelmasta tai tietokannasta, joka 
on julkaistu taikka jonka kappaleita on tekijän tai tietokannan valmistajan suostumuksella myyty tai 
muutoin pysyvästi luovutettu, taikka teoksesta 11 §:n 5 momentin vastaisesti.”
97 STA Chapter 8 Section 1: 
“Gör någon intrång i rätten till ett varukännetecken (varumärkesintrång) och sker det uppsåtligen eller 
av grov oaktsamhet, ska han eller hon dömas till böter eller fängelse i högst två år. Den som har överträtt 
ett vitesförbud enligt 3 § får inte dömas till ansvar för intrång som omfattas av förbudet.
För försök eller förberedelse till brott enligt första stycket döms till ansvar enligt 23 kap. 
 brottsbalken.
Åklagaren får väcka åtal för brott som avses i första eller andra stycket endast om målsäganden 
anger brottet till åtal och åtal av särskilda skäl är motiverat från allmän synpunkt.”
See above about the upcoming changes in legislation.
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Norway98 and Denmark.99 The trademark crime provisions in all of these countries 
make punishable, with slight variation in wording, the infringement of a registered 
trademark. Even though the concept of a registered trademark is not defined in the 
criminal provisions, the registration requirement itself clarifies the situation. This, 
however, is not the case with trademarks that are established through use, which 
raise the same uncertainty regarding the existence of the object of the exclusive right 
as do copyright crimes. None of the Nordic trademark crime provisions contain any 
specific references to other sections of the acts, but the actual content of the exclusive 
right must be determined based on other parts of the acts (for instance, which types 
of signs can be registered as trademarks, and so on). The acts in these countries do 
not set any other requirements, such as causing financial loss to the right-holder, for 
the essential elements to be fulfilled.
98 NTA Section 61: 
“Den som begår varemerkeinngrep straffes med bøter eller fengsel i inntil ett år.
Dersom det foreligger særlig skjerpende omstendigheter, er straffen bøter eller fengsel inntil tre år. 
Ved vurderingen av om særlig skjerpende omstendigheter foreligger skal det særlig legges vekt på den 
skade som er påført rettighetshaveren, herunder skade på rettighetshaverens kommersielle omdømme, 
den vinning som inngriperen har oppnådd, og omfanget av inngrepet for øvrig.
For overtredelse av denne bestemmelsen kan påtale unnlates hvis ikke allmenne hensyn tilsier 
påtale, jf. straffeprosessloven § 62 a. Ved inngrep i fellesmerke anses bare merkehaveren som fornærmet.”
99 DTA Section 42: 
“Med bøde straffes den, som forsætligt eller groft uagtsomt krænker en varemærkeret, der er stiftet ved 
registrering, ved brug, jf. § 3, stk. 1, nr. 3, eller i henhold til EU-varemærkeforordningen.
Stk. 2. Er overtrædelsen begået forsætligt og under skærpende omstændigheder, kan straffen stige 
til fængsel indtil 1 år og 6 måneder, medmindre højere straf er forskyldt efter straffelovens § 299 b. 
Skærpende omstændigheder anses navnlig at foreligge, hvis der ved overtrædelsen tilsigtes en betydelig og 
åbenbart retsstridig vinding.
Stk. 3. Der kan pålægges selskaber m.v. (juridiske personer) strafansvar efter reglerne i  
straffelovens 5. kapitel.
Stk. 4. Overtrædelser, som omfattes af stk. 1, påtales af den forurettede. Overtrædelser, som omfattes 
af stk. 2, påtales kun efter den forurettedes begæring, medmindre almene hensyn kræver påtale.”
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In Finland, trademark offences are punishable according to Chapter 49 Section 2 of 
the FCC,100 while the FTA includes the secondary trademark misdemeanour provi-
sion.101 The legislation technique regarding the FCC crime provision is the same as in 
copyright offences, including the internal references and the requirement of the act 
to be conducive to causing considerable financial loss to the right-holder.102 Howev-
er, the commission of an industrial property rights offence (a category that includes 
100 FCC Chapter 49 Section 2 (Teollisoikeusrikos):
“Joka tavaramerkkilain (544/2019), patenttilain (550/1967), mallioikeuslain (221/1971), yksinoikeud-
esta integroidun piirin piirimalliin annetun lain (32/1991), hyödyllisyysmallioikeudesta annetun lain 
(800/1991), kasvinjalostajanoikeudesta annetun lain (1279/2009), Euroopan unionin tavaramerkistä 
annetun Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetuksen (EU) 2017/1001 tai yhteisömallista annetun 
neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 6/2002 säännösten vastaisesti ja siten, että teko on omiaan aiheuttamaan 
huomattavaa taloudellista vahinkoa loukatun oikeuden haltijalle, loukkaa
1) tavaramerkkilain 3–9 §:n mukaista yksinoikeutta tavaramerkkiin käyttämällä samaa, sa-
mankaltaista, sekaannusvaaran aiheuttavaa tai olennaisilta ominaisuuksiltaan erottamattomis-
sa olevaa merkkiä ilman tavaramerkin haltijan suostumusta tai tämän kiellon vastaisesti tai 
muulla tähän rinnastettavalla tavalla,
2) Euroopan unionin tavaramerkistä annetun Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetuksen (EU) 
2017/1001 mukaista yksinoikeutta EU-tavaramerkkiin käyttämällä samaa, samankaltaista, 
sekaannusvaaran aiheuttavaa tai olennaisilta ominaisuuksiltaan erottamattomissa olevaa merk-
kiä, tunnusta tai merkintää ilman EU-tavaramerkin haltijan suostumusta tai tämän kiellon vas-
taisesti tai muulla tähän rinnastettavalla tavalla,
3) yhteisömallista annetun neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 6/2002 mukaista yksinoikeutta 
yhteisömalliin käyttämällä mallia hyväksi ilman yhteisömallin haltijan lupaa tai muulla tähän 
rinnastettavalla tavalla,
4) patentin tuottamaa yksinoikeutta,
5) mallioikeuslain 1, 5, 5 a–5 c ja 6 §:n mukaista mallioikeutta, käyttämällä mallia hyväksi ilman 
mallioikeuden haltijan lupaa tai muulla tähän rinnastettavalla tavalla,
6) oikeutta piirimalliin,
7) hyödyllisyysmallioikeutta tai
8) kasvinjalostajanoikeutta,
on tuomittava teollisoikeusrikoksesta sakkoon tai vankeuteen enintään kahdeksi vuodeksi.”
101 FTA Section 74: 
“Joka tahallaan loukkaa 3–9 §:n mukaista yksinoikeutta tavaramerkkiin tai EU-tavaramerkkiasetuksen 
mukaista yksinoikeutta EU-tavaramerkkiin käyttämällä samaa, samankaltaista, sekaannusvaaran ai-
heuttavaa tai olennaisilta ominaisuuksiltaan erottamattomissa olevaa merkkiä, tunnusta tai merkintää 
ilman tavaramerkin tai EU-tavaramerkin haltijan suostumusta tai tämän kiellon vastaisesti tai muulla 
tähän rinnastettavalla tavalla, on tuomittava, jollei teko ole rangaistava rikoslain (39/1889) 49 luvun 2 
§:ssä tarkoitettuna teollisoikeusrikoksena, tavaramerkkirikkomuksesta sakkoon.”
102 HE 94/1993 vp. pp. 219–220 (government proposal) and Nuotio, RL 49 luku: Eräiden 
aineettomien oikeuksien loukkaamisesta in Lappi-Seppälä et al, Rikosoikeus, (Juva 2009). p. 
1344. Industrial property rights do not contain moral rights, so intangible damages are not 
compensable in relation to industrial property rights offences acc ordant to HE 94/1993 vp. p. 
220 (government proposal). Decrease in the goodwill value of a trade mark may, however, be 
compensable as economic loss in some situations. See Nuotio (2009), p. 1358.
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trademark offences) does not require the aim to make profit, because it is character-
istic to industrial property rights that they are exploited specifically on a commer-
cial scale. Therefore, adding the requirement of aim to make profit to the essential 
elements of the industrial property rights offence has been seen as unnecessary. The 
approach in question has been justified with the fact that the target of protection of 
an exclusive right protected by industrial property rights legislation is, e.g., a trade-
mark, an invention, a model, a layout-design of an integrated circuit or a plant variety 
that is utilised in business activity and, therefore, the exclusive right does not include 
exploitation that is not conducted professionally. The criminal provision in question 
protects merely the right-holder’s financial interests and, therefore, the nuisance and 
suffering caused by the wilful infringement of one’s exclusive right do not fulfil the es-
sential elements of the crime.103 In Finland, as in other Nordic countries, the content 
of the exclusive right does not become clear merely based on the criminal provisions.
In theory, the Nordic copyright and trademark offences fulfil the requirements 
set for the blanket criminalisation technique, that is, the actual essential elements 
of the criminal conduct are determined based on other regulation than the criminal 
provision itself. However, as stated above, I would argue that the other sections of 
the laws do not actually define the criminalised acts with the clarity and precision 
required of criminal legislation, which is also exemplified in cases KKO 2018:21 and 
KKO 2018:36. Therefore, I also argue that the criminalisations altogether do not fulfil 
the requirements of the principle of legality as well as is expected.
In the field of copyright, the theoretical starting point is that copyright is a wide 
exclusive right with a flexible, constantly expanding purview. As new fields of art are 
developed, they fall automatically into copyright protection.104 This is very problem-
atic from the perspective of the principle of legality, because the principle requires 
accurately defined and limited criminalisations. If the theoretical starting points of 
copyright are applied also to copyright infringement criminalisations, the field of 
punishable behaviour widens uncontrollably every time a new form of art is created. 
This increases unforeseeability. 
4. Suggested Solutions
The problems specified above in chapters two and three could partly be solved by 
narrowing the sphere of criminalisation. In the field of copyright, this would mean 
criminalising only the most aggravated forms of acts that infringe the types of work 
103 HE 94/1993 vp. p. 220 (government proposal). One interesting element of the punishability of the 
industrial property rights offence is that, even though industrial property rights are specifically 
considered to be an essential part of business life, corporate criminal liability as a consequence 
of their infringement is not possible in Finland.
104 Tapio (2013), p. 36.
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that are known typically to exceed copyrighted work threshold. As new forms of art 
are created and new forms of acts are developed, the criminal provisions should be 
modified and extended to cover them, if considered necessary. The starting point 
should not be to criminalise every possible form of infringing act, but to criminal-
ise known unwanted behaviour that targets known types of work. Narrowing the 
sphere of criminalisation does not remove the problems regarding accuracy entirely, 
but it would enable more specific descriptions of acts, and hence increase the foresee-
ability of criminal law. 
Narrowing the sphere of criminalisation is not the only option. Elaborating the 
existing offence descriptions such that they describe the object of protection and un-
wanted behaviour in more detail could also have the desired effect. However, such 
elaboration would also lead to narrowing the sphere of criminalisation, as it is not 
possible to cover not-yet-existent forms of acts accurately enough until they first ap-
pear. Therefore, it should be accepted that criminalisations that target fields of rapid 
and constant technical development are continuously under re-evaluation and re-
quire modification due to this development. From the perspective of legal security, 
unforeseeable criminalisations can be seen as a bigger flaw than that some new forms 
of acts and types of work are momentarily left out of the criminalisation. 
In the field of trademark, the situation is altogether clearer, because the target of 
the criminalised infringement is often a registered trademark—although the defini-
tion of a registered trademark is not clarified in the actual criminal provisions. As 
pointed out above, in all Nordic countries trademark protection can also be estab-
lished through use, and the laws do not define specifically when existence of the ex-
clusive right begins and how wide the exclusive right is if a trademark is established 
through use. Therefore, the same problem of knowledge of the existence of the exclu-
sive right occurs regarding trademarks as in the field of copyright. This may lead to 
situations where the actor is not able to foresee the possibility of criminal sanctions 
following his actions, even with the help of a legal professional. 
The same solution of elaborating the existing descriptions of acts or narrowing 
the sphere of criminalisation altogether could also be beneficial in the field of trade-
mark law. Clarifying the situation from the perspective of the principle of legality 
necessitates the inclusion of more accurate definitions in the legislation regarding 
establishing trademark through use. This would require at least a definition of the 
procedure by which trademark protection is established through use, and guidelines 
regarding the exact moment when trademark protection is considered to be estab-
lished. The starting point should be the same as suggested for copyright: the crim-
inalisation should only target the known and most reprehensible activity, and the 
need for case-specific evaluation should be narrowed to a minimum. 
It is important to point out that copyright and trademark infringements are also 
sanctioned with civil remedies. These include damages, compensation and remuner-
ation, which can be awarded without an actual description of the infringing act in 
the law, unlike criminal punishments which always require a specific criminal provi-
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sion.105 Civil remedies ensure an actual compensation to the right-holder and enable 
the stopping and inhibiting of infringing activity. Civil remedies protect the interests 
of the right-holder, and thereby serve the purposes of the right-holder better than 
criminal sanctions, which is often more relevant to the right-holder than actually 
punishing the perpetrator.
The existence of rather extensive civil enforcement systems in the field raises the 
question of the necessity of wide criminalisations. This necessity should be evaluated 
from the perspective of need to point out the disapproval of society rather than from 
the perspective of the right-holder’s needs. This relates also to the principle of so-
cial cost evaluation. This line of argument applies not only to the problems regarding 
copyrighted work threshold, but also to those regarding moral rights. Based on the 
argumentation regarding strengthening the position of civil remedies in ensuring the 
compensation for right-holders and preserving criminalisations for the most blame-
worthy behaviour, I might even argue that the infringements of merely moral rights 
should be left outside the criminalisation. To my knowledge, infringements of merely 
moral rights are rather rare, which also speaks to the lack of for criminalisation. Usual-
ly, the infringement of moral rights exist together with the infringement of economic 
rights. This being the situation, the infringement of moral rights could still serve as an 
aggravating circumstance in the evaluation of a criminal conduct. I consider the sub-
jective elements of moral rights offences to increase the inaccuracy of the criminalisa-
tions unnecessarily. I would argue first that the conduct of leaving the author’s name 
unmentioned is not of such gravity that it requires society’s reaction in the form of 
criminalisation. Second, I consider that the existing legislation could answer the need 
for societal disapproval for the most severe violations of a person’s artistic dignity or 
eccentricity and reputation through the criminalisation of defamation. The principles 
of ultima ratio and social cost evaluation also support this argumentation.106 
The Norwegian legislation includes a possibility to impose an adminstrative fine 
in certain cases of breach of law, which could also work in the field of IP law as an 
alternative for criminal sanctioning.107 Using the administrative law system instead 
of the civil law system would help guarantee the legal security of the defendant due 
to public officials working under public liability being involved in the process. The 
payment would also be directed to the state instead of the right-holder, which would 
enable imposing a monetary sanction the amount of which exceeds the harm or 
damage caused to the right-holder. However, the administrative law system would 
not acknowledge the right-holder’s interests as widely as the civil law one. On the 
other hand, compared to the criminal law system, the standard of proof is not as high 
105 Andenæs (2016), pp. 104–105.
106 The application of these principles in this context will be analysed further in separate research. 
107 Lov om behandlingsmåten i forvaltningssaker (forvaltningsloven), LOV-1967-02-10, Chapter 9. 
An administrative fine is equivelant to a criminal sanction as criminal sanctions are defined in 
the European Convention of Human Rights, Chapter 9 Section 43.
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in the administrative procedure, and the procedure itself is usually more rapid.108 
More effective usage of civil or administrative sanctioning systems would enable 
more precise formation of the crime provisions without limiting the sphere of sanc-
tionability. Even though moving a conduct from one santioning system to another 
is a choice more easily justified by other principles of criminalisation, I would argue 
that it would also improve the execution of the principle of legality regarding these 
crime types. If more forms of conduct are sanctionable with civil or administrative 
remedies, the criminal provisions can be enacted more clearly and precisely. 
5. Conclusions
This article studied copyright and trademark infringement criminalisations in the 
Nordic countries from the perspective of the principle of legality. The main research 
questions were: 1. How do the current Nordic copyright and trademark offences ful-
fil the requirements of the principle of legality? 2. How could these offences fulfil the 
requirements of the principle of legality better? The study focused on the phrasing 
and style of the essential elements of the criminal provisions. It recognised the main 
problem-causing elements to be the multiple internal references and blanket crimi-
nalisation technique combined with inaccurate definitions of the objects of protec-
tion. These were exemplified through three examples from the fields of copyright 
and trademark: copyrighted work threshold as a prerequisite for copyright protection, 
establishing trademark through use as a requirement for the formation of an exclusive 
right, and subjective dimensions of moral rights as a basis for punishable behaviour. 
Common to all these example situations was that the laws do not define their content 
precisely enough. In the first two, it is ultimately determined by the court whether 
the existence of an exclusive right can be verfied. The last is based on the (potentially 
unknown) right-holder’s subjective conceptions and experiences.
This article showed that the Nordic copyright and trademark infringement crimi-
nalisations could fulfil the requirements of the principle of legality better, for it seems 
extremely difficult to define the limits of punishable behaviour merely based on the 
essential elements of the offences. The descriptions of acts are not precise and the 
use of the blanket criminalisation technique in the field makes the provisions vague, 
which increases the unforeseeability of criminal law. The article pointed out the prob-
lems regarding the requirement of written legislation, the prohibition of analogy, and 
the prohibition of vagueness. The article showed that the phrasings of the offences do 
not satisfactorily specify the actual descriptions of the criminalised conduct, and are 
partly so arcane and general that it can be questioned whether the descriptions of the 
acts are actually written in the legislation at all. 
108 The usability and difficulties regarding the use of civil or administrative sanctioning systems 
cannot be analysed here thoroughly but will be revisited in a separate article.
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As a result, forbidden analogy may turn out to be inevitable in two situations. First, 
if the phrasing of a provision does not specify an act at all, the interpretation going 
outside the written law cannot be prevented. Second, if the specification of the pro-
vision is open and, therefore, so wide that basically any act would fall under its ap-
plication, it allows the application of criminal law also in other situations than those 
specified in the criminal provision. The article argues that the Nordic copyright and 
trademark offences should be rephrased in such a way that concrete actions could be 
better defined based on them. 
This article suggested that in order to fulfil the requirements of the principle of 
legality better, the Nordic copyright and trademark offences should be revised and 
simplified, and more specific descriptions of acts should be included in them. This 
could be realised by narrowing the sphere of criminalisation to cover only the most 
aggravated forms of acts. The starting point of defining these acts could be the TRIPS 
Agreement requirement of criminalising at least wilful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. At the very least, this would require more 
specific legal definitions for types of behaviour that are considered counterfeiting 
and piracy on a commercial scale, or equatable to them. The article also suggested 
that criminalisations should only involve known behaviour and known objects of 
protection. The article recognised that narrowing the sphere of criminalisation does 
not necessarily remove the problems regarding accuracy entirely, but argued that it 
will enable more specific descriptions of acts and hence increase the foreseeability of 
criminal law.  
Narrowing the sphere of criminalisation only to the most aggravated forms of 
acts was not seen as the only option to improve the fulfilment of the principle of le-
gality. Elaborating the existing descriptions of acts could also serve as a way to clarify 
the legal state. This involves the inclusion of more accurate definitions of necessary 
legal concepts in the legislation. However, in order to optimally fulfil the require-
ments of clarity and precision, the existing descriptions of acts should be modified 
to cover only the known forms of acts and known forms of creation. This would also 
lead to somewhat narrowing the sphere of criminalisation, for the current criminal-
isations cover also yet unexisting acts and unexisting forms of the object of protec-
tion. Modifying the criminal provisions to cover only known forms of acts would 
enable enacting them with the required precision, and it would increase the foresee-
ability of criminal law in these crime types.
In all of the Nordic countries, the legislation regarding copyright and trademark 
offences is complicated and the scope of criminalisation is extremely wide. It appears 
to be very difficult, if not in some situations impossible, to say merely based on the 
crime provisions, or even based on the entire special law, what is actually punishable 
and how severely. In addition to the difficulties from the perspective of the principle 
of legality, this is also problematic from the point of view of legal security. Crimi-
nal liability should not come as a surprise to an actor—the actor should be able to 
foresee the possible consequences of his actions at the moment of the conduct. In 
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other words, the use of criminal law should not be unforeseeable. In fields that are 
under rapid and constant technical development, the possibilities to enact both ex-
tensive and sufficiently precise criminalisations are rather thin. Therefore, the article 
suggested that in order to both succesfully fulfil the requirements of the principle 
of legality and guarantee legal security, the legislator should concentrate on enact-
ing limited, clear and precise criminalisations along with modifying and expanding 
them when necessary, instead of attempting to cover every future scenario in current 
legislation. 
Finally, the article suggested that, going forward, focus should be moved more to-
wards civil or administrative remedies, whether or not the sphere of criminalisations 
is narrowed. Civil remedies are the correct tool to ensure a fair compensation for the 
right-holder and stop the infringing activity, as they are designed to serve the pur-
poses of the right-holder. They also include an element of coercion—the perpetrator 
must, for instance, pay damages, which the perpetrator may feel as a punishment. 
More effective use of the other enforcement systems would support the idea of pre-
serving criminal sanctions for the most severe situations, in which there are specific 
grounds for criminalisations. In this way, the criminal provisions will become more 
precise and the use of criminal law more foreseeable. 
